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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the internet as a catalyst, the gambling and 
sports betting industries have seen massive change. The gambling 
debate has been ongoing since the beginning of American history, 
and the debate continues to evolve as the industry itself evolves.1 At 
the heart of the issue is a tension between the individual’s personal 
freedom and the government’s interest in protecting the public 
from economic hardship and moral complications.2  
Regulating the gambling industry is a balancing act.3 Many 
stakeholders—including state and federal governments, individual 
citizens, businesses, and Native American tribes—have differing 
interests that must be considered for successful regulation.4 Thus, 
effective solutions that can withstand the test of time need to offer a 
clear path for gambling regulation as the industry continues to 
evolve.5 Policymakers must find and implement such solutions to 
maximize the social and economic benefits that gambling can have 
in modern society.6  
1. Ruth Graham, Gambling: An American Love/Hate Story, BOS. GLOBE (July 13,
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/07/12/gambling-american-
love-hate-story/4Ew8inwsSIzQBLyhRFl19H/story.html [https://perma.cc/2L4L-
GB8C] (describing the evolution of gambling in the United States since the 
seventeenth century). 
2. See Emanuel V. Towfigh et al., Dangerous Games: The Psychological Case for
Regulating Gambling, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 147, 153 (2013) (outlining the negative 
effects widespread gambling can have on problem gamblers). 
3. Alex Blaszczynski et al., A Science-Based Framework for Responsible Gambling:
The Reno Model, 20 J. OF GAMBLING STUD. 301, 303 (2004) (discussing how 
stakeholders in the gambling industry oftentimes have differing and competing 
interests and approach gambling regulation from different perspectives). 
4. Id. (listing the various stakeholders in the field of gambling).
5. William R. Eadington, The Economics of Casino Gambling, 13 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 173, 189–90 (1999) (discussing the evolution of the gambling industry and 
how public policy must evolve with the industry). 
6. Blaszczynski, supra note 3, at 302, 309 (stating policymakers need to
2
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Minnesota has not legalized online gambling7 and has struggled 
to regulate online gambling in ways that are beneficial to our 
society.8 This Note focuses on Minnesota as a platform for change in 
regulation. In doing so, this Note first discusses the history of 
gambling regulation in the United States,9 the effect of the internet 
on gambling and the growth of the online gambling industry,10 
modern attempts at regulation,11 and the problems technological 
advances have on these regulations.12 Next, it discusses gambling 
context and regulation in Minnesota specifically.13 An analysis of 
tribal interests in online gambling regulation follows.14 Finally, the 
Note offers a possible solution to increase the consistency and 
effectiveness of online gambling regulation.15 
II. HISTORY OF ONLINE GAMBLING REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Authority
Understanding gambling regulation in the United States 
requires an understanding of the government’s regulatory power. 
Congress’ power to regulate gambling arises from the Commerce 
Clause of the United State Constitution.16 Commerce Clause 
“implement a strategic framework that will reduce or eliminate the potential harms 
that can be associated with gambling while simultaneously maximizing the potential 
benefits of gambling,” including “recreational, social and economic benefits to 
individuals and the community”). 
7. Legal US Online Gambling by State, LEGAL BETTING ONLINE,
https://www.legalbettingonline.com/states [https://perma.cc/8UYD-RHP3] (last 
visited June 20, 2018) (charting the fifty states’ gambling legality and regulation). 
8. See Declan McCullagh, Minnesota Orders ISPs to Blacklist Gambling Sites, CNET
(May 1, 2009, 11:20 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/minnesota-orders-isps-to-
blacklist-gambling-sites/ [https://perma.cc/56GL-4G2J] (“The state of Minnesota 
has handed Internet providers a 7-page blacklist (PDF) of gambling Web sites that 
they’re supposed to prevent customers from accessing . . . .”). 
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.G.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have the power
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and 
with the Indian Tribes”). 
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jurisprudence has evolved over time. In the early 1800s, Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce was characterized in Gibbons 
v. Ogden as broad and virtually absolute.17 Today, the extent of
federal commerce power depends on the factors laid out in the 
relatively modern Supreme Court decision, United States. v. Lopez.18 
In Lopez, the Court held that Congress may regulate (1) the channels 
of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce.19 Congress has the authority to regulate 
gambling in the United States because it is an activity that has a 
substantial relationship to interstate commerce.20 Though Congress 
has the authority to regulate interstate commerce, it may choose to 
delegate its authority to the states.21 In this way, the United States 
regulates gambling through both federal and state law.22  
B. Historical Context
United States gambling jurisprudence originates from English 
law.23 Prior to the formation of the United States, the English 
brought gambling to the colonies, in the form of lotteries, to fund 
infrastructure projects.24 Thereafter, the colonies themselves used 
17. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (analyzing Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce). 
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. Id. at 558–59.
20. Id.
21. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648,
652–53 (1981) (recognizing Congress’ power to give States the authority to restrict 
the flow of interstate commerce). The Court explained, “[i]f Congress ordains that 
the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by 
a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable 
to Commerce Clause challenge.” Id. 
22. See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5361–67 (2006) (aiming to restrict the flow of money to and from online 
gambling websites); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.75 (2017) (outlining Minnesota 
gambling restrictions).  
23. See G. Robert Blakey, Gaming, Lotteries, and Wagering: The Pre-Revolutionary
Roots of the Law of Gambling, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 211, 214 (1985) (explaining the history 
and origination of gambling law in the United States from a pre-revolutionary 
perspective). 
24. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A
Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 24 (1992) 
(describing the use of lotteries to raise revenue for the benefit and support of 
settlements in Virginia). 
4
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lotteries to fund their own public works.25 Betting on horse racing 
was also popular at this time, and in 1665, New York became the first 
state with a racetrack.26 
Critics took notice of the popularity of gambling in this era. In 
response, Congress enacted the Statute of Anne,27 which was 
incorporated into the laws of every state and made some larger 
gambling debts uncollectable, slowing gambling’s popularity.28 The 
nineteenth century marked the decline of public lotteries in the 
United States, and a complete lottery ban was issued towards the end 
of the century.29 The public perception of the morality of gambling 
at this time is articulated well in the 1905 Supreme Court decision 
Marvin v. Trout,30 which stated, “[f]or a great many years past 
gambling has been very generally in this country regarded as a vice, 
to be prevented and suppressed in the interest of the public morals 
and the public welfare.”31 This perception led to a period with little 
to no legalized gambling and no state-sponsored gambling until New 
Hampshire reintroduced the United States to the state-run lottery in 
1964.32 
Despite a negative social view of the lottery, non-lottery 
gambling did not stop. Instead, it moved to an unregulated, 
25. Id. at 25 (listing various public works funded by lotteries between 1746 and
the Civil War). 
26. See Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” in Defense of “The Law of the Horse”:
The Historical and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 473, 484 (2004) (outlining the development of horse racing in the United 
States). Interestingly, horse racing as a form of gambling faced much less opposition 
from gambling critics because bettors had to be physically present at the racetrack. 
See id. at 493–94. 
27. See Statute of Anne (1710), 8 Ann. c. 19, §§ 1–8 (Eng.) (making gambling
debts over ten pounds uncollectible). 
28. See Darren A. Prum & Carlin McCrory, The Technological and Business
Evolution of Machine-Based Gambling in America, 14 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL.
PROP. L. 237, 244 (2014); Rychlak, supra note 24, at 20.  
29. See Rychlak, supra note 24, at 32–38 (outlining the fall of public lotteries in
the United States). This wave of public disfavor culminated with the famous 
Supreme Court decision, Champion v. Ames, which held that Congress can regulate 
interstate commerce by banning lottery tickets from interstate commerce entirely. 
188 U.S. 321, 354 (1903). 
30. 199 U.S. 212 (1905).
31. Id. at 224.
32. Rychlak, supra note 24, at 44. Other states then followed New Hampshire’s
lead. In 1967, New York introduced a lottery, and New Jersey did in 1970. Id. at 
44–45.  
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underground environment.33 In 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that a full-time gambler could declare himself to be in 
“the trade or business” of gambling for tax purposes, effectively 
authorizing professional gambling as a legitimate career.34 Presently, 
many states offer brick-and-mortar casinos, racetracks, and card 
rooms where gamblers can legally win and lose money. Most states 
run lotteries, even though some do not have any other form of 
legalized gambling.35 This is where the nuance of online gambling 
law occurs in contemporary jurisprudence. With no outright federal 
ban on gambling, the states are left to regulate gambling as they see 
fit within their borders, leading to inconsistency and inefficacy. 
C. Effect of Modern Technology on Gambling in the United States
As modern technology continues to advance, regulation of 
online gambling is becoming increasingly difficult. The advent of 
the internet created an easily accessible arena for consumers to 
gamble.36 Because of the growing customer base, many companies 
decided to operate online sports betting and other forms of online 
gambling, such as poker and blackjack.37 Online poker became 
especially popular, with millions of daily players throughout the 
United States.38 The accessibility of online poker and its relative 
proximity to the game’s greatest players (such as Chris 
Moneymaker) contributed to its success in the early 2000s.39 Like in 
33. See Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, (1997) http://web.uncg.edu/dc
l/courses/vicecrime/m2/gambling%20in%20california.html  [https://perma.cc/ 
PPB9-NE2L] (last visited June 20, 2018) (noting the ineffectual nature of gambling 
prohibition on curbing actual betting activities in the United States). 
34. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35–36 (1987).
35. Rychlak, supra note 24, at 45.
36. See David B. Kuznick, Betting Blind: Problems with Proposed Federal Regulation
of Online Poker, 12 J. HIGH TECH L. 450 (2012) (discussing the growth of online poker 
and other forms of online gambling regulations). 
37. Id. at 463.
38. Id. (“An estimated twenty-three million Americans play poker and fifteen
million play online for money.” (citing Topline Findings, POKER PLAYERS RESEARCH, 
http://pokerplayersresearch.com/toplinefindings.aspx [https://perma.cc/S2X6-
K2EW] (last visited June 20, 2018))). 
39. See id. Chris Moneymaker, an amateur poker player, started with $40 online
at Pokerstars.com, won a series of small online satellite tournaments, and eventually 
won a seat in the 2003 World Series of Poker Main Event. Id. at 463–64. Moneymaker 
placed first in the main event to win $2,500,000. Id. This success story is what attracts 
so many customers to online poker tournaments and events. See CHRIS MONEYMAKER
6
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early American history, gambling critics noticed this growing 
market, and federal and state governments attempted to regulate it 
with inconsistent results.40  
One major success of this regulation was the events that 
occurred on “Black Friday” (as it is known in the online poker 
community).41 On April 15, 2011, “the U.S. Department of Justice 
unsealed a 52-page indictment against the top executives of 
PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute Poker, as well as a [$3 
billion] civil complaint against those companies.”42 Facing 
indictment, the companies immediately stopped serving U.S. 
players, shocking the online poker community and causing outrage 
among the game’s players.43 
The perceived moral complications of gambling were amplified 
by the increase in the availability of gambling.44 Some of the 
traditional social barriers to gambling were lessened or removed with 
the rise in popularity of the internet casino.45 However, critics 
emphasized how easier access to gambling could draw in addictive 
personalities and the financially vulnerable. For example, it is easier 
& DANIEL PAISNER, MONEYMAKER: HOW AN AMATEUR POKER PLAYER TURNED $40 INTO
$2.5 MILLION AT THE WORLD SERIES OF POKER 207–09 (2005); Aaron Angerman, Great 
Moments from the World Series of Poker Pt IV: Moneymaker’s Effect on the Main Event, 
POKERPAGES.COM, http://archive.is/3d3Hr [https://perma.cc/NZ6V-YNVJ] (last 
visited June 20, 2018). 
40. See generally Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting
Internet Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41 (2010) 
(discussing the problems of current federal regulations on online gambling, 
especially with regard to modern technology and states’ rights issues).  
41. See Martin Harris, Black Friday: Reliving Poker’s Darkest Day Five Years Later,
POKERNEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.pokernews.com/news/2016/04/black-
friday-five-years-later-24506.htm [https://perma.cc/66FA-LLNR] (reflecting on the 
day several large online poker companies were forced out of the United States after 
being indicted on federal charges under the UIGEA).  
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Kiran S. Raj, Drawing a Line in the Sand: How the Federal Government Can
Work with the States to Regulate Internet Gambling, 56 EMORY L.J. 777, 790–91 (2006) 
(designating three categories of the social costs of gambling: (1) adverse effect on 
individuals, psychological, and financial; (2) underage gambling; and (3) social 
welfare costs). 
45. See id. at 798 (“An underage gambler will have an easier time accessing an
Internet gambling site than gambling at a casino because it is more difficult for a 
gambling site to detect if someone is underage than for traditional casinos.”). It is 
also easier for underage gamblers to work around some forms of age verification 
procedures online than at a casino. Id. 
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for an underage gambler to access an internet gambling website 
rather than a casino because gambling sites find it difficult to detect 
if someone is underage.46 
Problems with regulation originate from several factors 
propagated by modern technology: (1) Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) technologies allowing for geo-location circumvention,47 
(2) off-shore banking and casino websites that operate outside of 
U.S. jurisdiction,48 (3) the way in which cryptocurrency adds to user 
anonymity,49 and (4) Commerce Clause complications with 
consistent regulation.50 More complications with modern 
regulations are discussed below. With no clear solution to the 
regulation of online gambling, both federal and state governments 
have tried to counteract these issues with various pieces of legislation 
aimed at curbing online gambling. These efforts are examined 
below. 
46. See id. at 791.
47. Brian Pempus, “Screw the Government, Get Yourself a VPN” for Online Poker,
Says Australian Lawmaker, CARDPLAYER (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.cardplayer.com/ 
poker-news/21377-screw-the-government-get-yourself-a-vpn-for-online-poker-says-a 
ustralian-lawmaker [https://perma.cc/89UN-CK72] (“VPNs are known for helping 
poker players try to circumvent geo-location restrictions.”). 
48. See Tony Batt, Chances Seem Slim for Passing Net Betting Ban, CASINO
CITY TIMES (Aug. 28, 2006), www.casinocitytimes.com/article/chances-seem-slim-
for-passing-net-betting-ban-55156 [https://perma.cc/E7W3-44Z5] (“[Internet 
gambling] has gone from 30 offshore Web sites taking in $30 million in bets in 1996 
to a $12 billion industry with more than 2,300 Web sites this year.”). See generally 
King, supra note 40, at 55 (discussing the WTO’s ruling against U.S. law in favor of 
foreign internet gambling operators). 
49. Florian Gheorghe, Is Cryptocurrency the Answer to U.S. Anti-Poker
Laws?, POKERTUBE (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.pokertube.com/article/is-
cryptocurrency-the-answer-to-us-anti-poker-laws [https://perma.cc/EHW4-5Z7S] 
(explaining the legal gray area and anonymity associated with cryptocurrency and 
its impact on online poker games in the United States). 
50. See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(discussing the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to state regulation of 
the internet); see also King, supra note 40, at 57 (“[T]he Internet’s architecture seems 
to force states to choose between two equally unpalatable options [for regulating 
online gambling]: violating the Dormant Commerce Clause or forgoing 
enforcement entirely.”). 
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III. MODERN ATTEMPTS AT ONLINE GAMBLING REGULATION
There are four main federal statutes that constitute the modern 
attempts at federal regulation of online gambling: (1) the Wire Act,51 
(2) the Travel Act,52 (3) the Illegal Gambling Business Act,53 and 
(4) the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act.54 These 
statutes, with the exception of the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act, were mostly enacted before the advent of online 
gambling and have been reinterpreted to make some forms of 
online gambling illegal.55 Each of these statutes will be examined in 
detail below.  
A. The Wire Act 
The Wire Act, enacted in 1961, prohibits gamblers from using a 
wire communication facility to receive bets or send gambling 
information.56 Two elements must be present to find a violation of 
this Act: (1) information transmitted over the wire must assist “in the 
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest;” and 
(2) during the time of transmission, the defendant must have been 
engaged in the business of wagering.57 The Wire Act was originally 
intended for two purposes: (1) to assist states in “the enforcement of 
their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses;” 
and (2) to “aid in the suppression of organized gambling activities 
by prohibiting the use of . . . wire communication facilities which are 
or will be used for the transmission of certain gambling information 
51. See Federal Interstate Wire Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012).
52. See International Travel Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014) (commonly
known as the “Travel Act”). 
53. See Illegal Gambling Business Act (ILBA) of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2014);
see also Jeffrey Rodefer, Internet Gambling in Nevada: Overview of Federal Law Affecting 
Assembly Bill 466, 6 GAMING L. REV. 393, 403 (2002) (explaining the history of the 
Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970).  
54. See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–67
(2006). 
55. See King, supra note 40, at 45 (“[The Wire Act, Travel Act, and Illegal
Gambling Business Act] have collectively been interpreted to make some, and 
perhaps all, forms of online gambling illegal.”). The UIGEA, which was enacted in 
2006, supplemented these laws by making it illegal for banks to process (and 
gambling businesses to receive) funds connected to online gambling activities that 
are illegal under federal or state law. Id. 
56. See Federal Interstate Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
57. See Raj, supra note 44, at 783.
9
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in interstate and foreign commerce.”58 It was expected that the Wire 
Act would serve as an essential tool in combating organized crime 
syndicates and their related illegal gambling activities.59 Because the 
Wire Act was enacted without internet gambling in mind, 
reinterpretations of the statute were needed in order for it to apply 
to contemporary illegal gambling.60 
In the 2001 case United States v. Cohen, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was asked to decide whether an 
Antigua-based online sports book company, which operated as a 
wager platform for popular sports events, violated the Wire Act.61 
The court held that Cohen’s operation of the sports book company 
involved two distinct wire facilities: the telephone and the internet.62 
These two wire facilities transmitted sports betting information and 
the wagers themselves, and thus violated the Wire Act.63 The court’s 
decision applied the Wire Act to forms of online gambling through 
express designation of the internet as a wire facility.64 The Wire Act, 
a statute designed to hamper organized crime in the 1960s, was 
therefore interpreted to apply to online gambling. 
B. The Travel Act 
The Travel Act, also enacted in 1961, assists states in preventing 
criminal conduct beyond each state’s individual borders.65 The 
Travel Act, when combined with the Wire Act, functions as another 
tool in the battle against organized crime.66 The Supreme Court, 
however, declined to limit the Travel Act to the prosecution of 
organized crime.67 In order for a defendant to violate the Travel Act, 
58. Id. (citing David B. McGinty, The Near-Regulation of Online Sports Wagering by
United States v. Cohen, 7 GAMING L. REV. 205, 209 (2003)). 
59. Raj, supra note 44, at 785.
60. See id.
61. United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the
application of the Wire Act to a foreign-based sports book company that did the 




65. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
66. See Raj, supra note 44, at 786 (noting that in order to defeat organized crime
and racketeering, the United States needed a way to prosecute organized crime 
members who resided in one state but engaged in criminal conduct in another).  
67. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (holding that the
Travel Act is not limited to the prosecution of organized crime). 
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there must be: (1) interstate travel or use of a facility in commerce; 
(2) with the intent to promote an unlawful activity; and (3) the 
defendant must thereafter perform, attempt to perform, or facilitate 
an overt act in furtherance of the unlawful activity.68 This law applies 
mainly to gambling enterprises and not to individual bettors.69 
In applying the Travel Act to online gambling, one must analyze 
the two key sections of the Act: (1) the jurisdictional element of 
interstate travel; and (2) what constitutes a “business enterprise.”70 
The jurisdictional element of the Travel Act is met with help from 
the Wire Act, with reference to the “telecommunications component 
of the internet” or to “any interstate or foreign nexus of payment of 
the debts resulting from the gambling.”71 Importantly, an 
impermissible gambling business enterprise is defined by its 
continuity and conduct outlawed by a federal or state statute.72 Thus, 
the Travel Act has been applied to online gambling in addition to its 
original purpose of combating organized crime. 
C. The Illegal Gambling Business Act
The Illegal Gambling Business Act (ILBA), part of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, was enacted in 1970 as a 
further effort to battle organized crime.73 The intent of the ILBA, 
according to the House Report, was to “deal only with large-scale 
illegal gambling activities and with corrupt state officials that allow 
them to operate.”74 “The ILBA makes it a crime to operate an illegal 
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000).
69. See Raj, supra note 44, at 787 (explaining that a literal reading of the Travel
Act precludes its use against bettors or mere customers because they are not 
engaged in the gambling business either substantively or as accomplices, whereas 
case law on the Travel Act applying to gambling enterprises is clear that the Act 




73. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803(a), 84 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955 (2012)); Note, Investigating Dirty Money: Section 1962(A) of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L. J. 1491, 1491–92, 1492 n.9 (1974); Raj, supra note 44, 
at 787.  
74. Raj, supra note 44, at 787 (“The House Report on the ILBA states that the
purpose of the statute is to deal only with large-scale illegal gambling activities and 
with corrupt state officials that allow them to operate.”).  
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gambling business.”75 The statute defines an illegal gambling 
business as any operation that: 
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision 
in which it is conducted;  
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, 
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such 
business; and  
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous 
operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross 
revenue of $2,000 in any single day.76 
The ILBA can be applied to online gambling, especially the 
larger website operators. Because internet companies, by their 
nature, can be run by a relatively small number of people, the most 
difficult element to meet is the five-person element.77 However, 
because courts have broadly construed the terms “conduct” and 
“finance,” people with attenuated relationships to the gambling 
business may be counted towards the five-person minimum. Courts 
have reasoned that “Congress’s intent was to include all those who 
participate in the operation of a gambling business, regardless of 
how minor their    roles . . . . Only customers of the business were to 
be excluded.”78 Thus, the ILBA applies to online gambling 
businesses, as they can meet all the required elements for a violation 
of the statute. 
D. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA)79 
was added to a maritime and port security bill called the SAFE Port 
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b) (2012).
77. Raj, supra note 44, at 788 (stating that an online “gambling operation may
potentially contract out all of the work necessary to run the operation,” therefore 
not meeting the five-person requirement of the ILBA). While these contractors 
might be “aiders and abettors” of the operation, case law clarifies that these people 
would not count toward the five-person rule of the ILBA. Id. (holding that a 
violation of the statute must exist before an aider and abettor can be found guilty 
under the ILBA).  
78. United States v. Schullo, 363 F.Supp. 246, 250 (D. Minn. 1973).
79. Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 802(a), 120 Stat. 1957 (codified as 31 U.S.C. § 5363
(2006)). 
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Act80 as a last minute, “unrelated rider.”81 Unlike previous statutes 
passed before the internet was created, UIGEA was specifically 
meant to stifle online gambling rather than combat organized crime 
and large gambling syndicates.82 The UIGEA focuses on regulating 
financial institutions to make it more difficult for United States 
residents to gamble on offshore internet websites.83 This is a 
backdoor way of regulating gambling, and is a last ditch effort to 
curb some of the perceived negative effects of internet gambling.84  
The UIGEA “prohibits any person from accepting money from 
someone who has engaged in unlawful Internet gambling.”85 
Further, the UIGEA allows the Attorney General and the Secretary 
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve “to prescribe 
regulations to identify and block gambling-related transactions” at 
their discretion.86 This law may help states that ban online gambling 
enforce their bans more effectively.87  
Together, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, ILBA, and UIGEA make 
up the principal federal laws regulating internet gambling in the 
United States.88 That being said, federal law does not outright ban 
online gambling, leaving states to legislate as they think best to serve 
80. Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347,
120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 
81. Raj, supra note 44, at 789 (first citing Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 802, 120 Stat. 1884, 1952–61 (2006); then 
citing Jonathan Weisman, Internet Gambling, Port Deal Reached, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 
2006, at A08). 
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a) (2006)) (“To justify passage of the Act,
Congress relied on four main findings: First, internet gambling is funded primarily 
through credit cards and wire transfers; second, the National Gambling Impact 
Study (NGIS) recommended passage of this type of legislation; third, internet 
gambling is increasing consumer debt problems, and fourth, traditional and former 
mechanisms of enforcing gambling laws are inadequate.”).  
84. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006)) (explaining that the UIGEA “does
not change significantly the current substantive law on Internet gambling”). 
85. Id. (citation omitted) (noting that this law is aimed at financial institutions
and is intended to prevent a gambler from receiving any funds from an offshore 
casino). 
86. Id. (citation omitted) (explaining that added specificity results from these
officials determining further regulations that identify and block suspected illegal 
gambling transactions). 
87. Id. at 790.
88. Id. at 783 (“[T]he four main laws that are applicable to Internet gambling:
[are] the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, and the 
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act.”). 
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their constituents. In order to fully understand the federal gambling 
regulation landscape, however, one must analyze gambling on 
Native American reservations and the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act.89  
E. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Native American culture has long supported forms of gambling, 
and games of skill or athletic events were often combined with 
wagers.90 In the late 1970s, Native American tribes turned to 
high-stakes bingo as a source of revenue in response to declining 
federal funds and other limited economic development 
opportunities.91 These early bingo operations were largely 
successful, and the increased self-sufficiency of the tribes enticed 
other tribes to follow suit.92 
Conflict arose when state governments and the federal 
government disagreed about which one maintained jurisdiction in 
taxing or revenue sharing from the tribes’ bingo operations.93 In 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established a favorable precedent for 
tribes to continue opening bingo parlors,94 leading to a steady 
increase in Indian bingo parlors and other gaming among the 
tribes.95 Congress generally supported this tribal interest because it 
allowed Native Americans greater self-sufficiency96 and because 
89. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467–86 (1988) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012)). 
90. Prum, supra note 28, at 250 (explaining that Native Americans had forms
of gaming that originated through their own unique culture). 
91. Id. In 1975, New York’s Oneida Tribe started to run bingo parlors, which
was followed by Florida’s Seminole Tribe in 1979. Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne R. 
Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian Gaming? “A Few Pages of History Are 
Worth a Volume of Logic”, 1996 BYU L. REV. 407, 434 (1996). 
92. Prum, supra note 28, at 250.
93. Id. at 251; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310,
316 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Seminole high-stakes bingo games were 
merely regulated, not prohibited by state law, making bingo a civil issue instead of 
a criminal issue, and were therefore immune to a shut-down by the Florida sheriff 
under the Florida statute). 
94. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 658 F.2d at 316.
95. Dunstan, supra note 33 (explaining the growth and evolution of Native
American casino gambling on reservations in the United States). 
96. Prum, supra note 28, at 251. Full support of Congress was not given,
however, and some states and lawmakers had concerns about allowing more forms 
14
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living conditions were poor on reservations compared to the rest of 
the United States.97 There was still some disagreement, however, 
about the breadth of Native Americans’ power to conduct gambling 
on their reservations, which led to the passage of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA).98 
IGRA creates three “classes” of gaming that allow for differing 
levels of approval, oversight, and gambling activities on Native 
American land.99 Class I gaming is under complete control of the 
tribes, and it includes gambling for small prizes and games 
associated with tribal ceremonies.100  
Class II gaming includes non-electronic games such as card 
games, lottery-style games, and bingo.101 These games are only legal 
on the reservations if the state itself allows that form of a game, or at 
least does not expressly prohibit it.102 Further, tribes must create an 
ordinance approved by the Chairman of the National Indian 
Gaming Commission to conduct Class II gaming.103 While Class II 
of gambling on Native American reservations, claiming that they needed authority 
to combat organized crime. Id. It is speculated, however, that states were mostly 
concerned with a potential loss in tax revenue. Id. 
97. See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
216–18 (1987) (“The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian 
sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its 
“overriding goal” of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic 
development. . . . These are important federal interests. . . . More specifically, the 
Department of the Interior, which has the primary responsibility for carrying out 
the Federal Government’s trust obligations to Indian tribes, has sought to 
implement these policies by promoting tribal bingo enterprises.”); Duane 
Champagne, Living or Surviving on Native American Reservations, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Sept. 27, 2017), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/living-or-
surviving-on-native-american-reservations/ [https://perma.cc/FRX7-Y9AR] 
(describing poverty on reservations and discussing some historical reasons for this 
poverty). 
98. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). Ronald Reagan signed the IGRA with 
the intent of permitting bingo halls and other small gaming operations. Prum, supra 
note 28, at 253. 
99. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
100. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7). 
101. Id.  
102. Id. § 2703(7)(b)(1)(A). 
103. Id. § 2703(7)(b)(1)(B). 
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games are mostly under tribal control, the National Indian Gaming 
Commission has some oversight capacity.104  
Class III gaming, which must be negotiated between the state 
that holds the reservation and the tribe itself, includes casino 
games.105 Class III activities have three requirements before they are 
permitted: (1) the state must allow some form of gaming;106 (2) the 
tribe must pass an ordinance authorizing the gaming that will 
occur;107 and (3) the gambling must comply with the agreed-upon 
terms.108 Further, states are required to act in good faith in 
constructing a compact with Native American tribes for gambling 
activities.109 Thus, though different states have varying levels of 
agreements with the tribes located within their borders, IGRA allows 
many tribes to offer a range of gambling activities,110 further 
delegating federal authority to the states in regulating forms of 
gambling as they see fit.  
F. Differing State Regulations
State regulation of online gambling varies widely between 
individual states.111 Some states, like Utah and Hawaii, have banned 
all forms of gambling, online or otherwise.112 In fact, Utah’s absolute 
 104. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) 
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
105. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d). 
106. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B). 
107. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A). 
108. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C). 
109. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
110. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) 
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
 111. See Benjamin Miller, The Regulation of Internet Gambling in the United States: 
It’s Time for the Federal Government to Deal the Cards, 34 J. OF THE NAT’L ASSOC. OF ADMIN. 
L. JUDICIARY 528, 528 n.5 (2014) (pointing out Congress’s understanding, as of 2013, 
of the “need for federal enforcement [of online gambling] because purely state 
regulation . . . varies widely between and among states, and states may not be able 
to adequately meet the challenges inherent in enforcing Internet gambling 
restrictions within their borders, especially against sophisticated out-of-state 
operators”). 
 112. See Legal Online Gambling in Hawaii for 2017, LEGAL BETTING ONLINE,
https://www.legalbettingonline.com/states/hawaii/ [https://perma.cc/SHH2-
Q4U2] (last visited June 20, 2018) (“Hawaii is one of the few states in the US 
that . . . doesn’t have any type of legal gambling entertainment.”); Utah Legal Online 
Gambling Guide 2017, LEGAL BETTING ONLINE, https://www.legalbetting 
online.com/states/utah/ [https://perma.cc/2KNL-9BH2] (last visited June 20, 
16
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prohibition on gambling is codified in its constitution.113 Other 
states—such as Nevada, New Jersey, Delaware, and recently, 
Pennsylvania—have state-regulated online casino games and sports 
betting rooms limited by geolocation technology that restricts usage 
within the geographic limits of the state.114 Still, other states—such 
as Tennessee—allow some state-sponsored gambling such as 
lotteries, raffles, and other games run by the state itself.115 These 
states often use tax revenue from the state-sponsored gambling for 
more “morally appropriate” causes, like school funding.116 The 
variety of approaches demonstrates the need for individualized 
gambling regulation that considers, balances, and prioritizes all 
appropriate interests.  
G. Problems with Modern Regulations
Prior to the passage of UIGEA, there was virtually no way to 
enforce online gambling prohibitions in the United States, neither 
at the federal nor state level.117 This is because off-shore internet 
gambling firms, who are outside U.S. jurisdiction, had an incentive 
2018) (“[There is] nothing legal in the state of Utah that remotely resembles 
gambling, not even a state lottery.”). 
 113. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 27 (“The Legislature shall not authorize any game 
of chance, lottery or gift enterprise under any pretense or for any purpose.”); see 
also Raj, supra note 44, at 781 (noting that in 2001, Tennessee amended its 
Constitution to permit a state lottery). Before this amendment, Tennessee had a 
complete prohibition on gambling similar to Utah and Hawaii. Id. 
 114. See Chris Grove, PA Online Casino and Poker—Latest News and Analysis, 
ONLINE POKER REP. (Jan. 3, 2018, 2:34 PM), https://www.onlinepoker 
report.com/us/pa/ [https://perma.cc/7MQQ-7LX6] (noting that the 
Pennsylvania bill legalizes and/or regulates online lottery, video gaming terminals 
at truck stops, satellite casinos, daily fantasy sports, and sports betting); Delaware 
Legal Online Gambling 2017, LEGAL BETTING ONLINE, https://www.legalbetting 
online.com/states/delaware/ [https://perma.cc/6L7H-7489] (last visited June 20, 
2018) (discussing Delaware’s online gambling regulations); New Jersey Online 
Gambling 2017, LEGAL BETTING ONLINE, https://www.legalbetting 
online.com/states/new-jersey/ [https://perma.cc/N7RT-NT9T] (last visited June 
20, 2018) (discussing New Jersey’s online gambling regulations); Nevada Online 
Gambling Guide, LEGAL BETTING ONLINE, http://www.legalbettingonline.com/ 
states/nevada/ [https://perma.cc/QYQ8-USKJ] (last visited June 20, 2018) 
(discussing Nevada’s online gambling regulations);  
 115. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-506 (2014) (exempting the Tennessee 
Education Lottery from consideration as the illegal running of a lottery). 
116. See Raj, supra note 44, at 781. 
117. Id. at 806. 
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to exploit any weaknesses or loopholes in the enforcement of a 
gambling prohibition.118 Thus, lawmakers have recently diverted 
their attention away from the actual gambling websites and moved 
their attention towards the financial institutions that help them 
function.119 
State and federal governments have focused on three areas to 
enforce prohibitions of online gambling: (1) credit card companies 
that allow would-be gamblers to deposit money into online gambling 
websites; (2) online payment providers that are developed to help 
e-commerce transactions; and (3) measures that hinder the transfer 
of gambling data across the internet.120 
The focus on financial institutions avoids the jurisdictional 
enforcement issues against off-shore companies, which are generally 
not subject to the laws of the United States.121 Theoretically, this 
focus on financial institutions also helps prevent individual U.S. 
residents who are prohibited from gambling by state law from 
gambling online.122 This prevention occurs because it regulates the 
two main ways U.S. residents fund their internet gambling—credit 
cards or other online payment providers such as PayPal.123  
Increased attention given to financial institutions has led to 
many credit card issuers implementing policies that prohibit 
internet gambling-related transactions.124 However, policies to shield 
 118. Id. Many offshore firms were able to operate their websites in the United 
States without fear of prosecution. Id. Without any meaningful threat to these 
internet gambling websites, they flourished in the United States despite the bans on 
gambling businesses that resulted from the Wire Act, Travel Act, and the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act. See id. 
 119. See Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition Will 
Ultimately Fail, 8 GAMING L. REV. 295, 296–99 (2004) (discussing U.S. efforts to 
prohibit internet gambling). 
 120. See Raj, supra note 44, at 806, 809–10 (noting that most of the enforcement 
issues are inherently technological in nature and suggesting that the government 
fining of PayPal for aiding online gambling removed PayPal from online gambling 
entirely, which transferred the funding mechanism to overseas firms or online 
casinos themselves). 
 121. Id. at 808 (“Currently, a large problem is that all the online casinos exist 
outside the effective control of any state or federal government.”); see also Parke, 
supra note 119, at 296–97.  
 122. See Raj, supra note 44, at 807 (“For U.S. residents to gamble over the 
Internet, the online casino must have the ability to receive and process payments 
from within the United States.”). 
123. See id. at 809–11. 
124. See id. at 807 (noting that, as a result of increased pressure from law 
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oneself from liability, detection, and enforcement of these 
transactions are entirely separate things.125 These companies 
struggle to deliver—even with pressure from law enforcement.126 
UIGEA aims to help prevent this problem. In particular, UIGEA 
allows the Attorney General and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to help create policies and procedures for 
detection and enforcement.127  
Some gamblers use online payment providers such as PayPal 
and Neteller to get around the prohibition on credit card 
transactions for internet gambling-related activities.128 The 
difference between these transactions and a credit card is that the 
online payment provider is funded before it is used in a transaction, 
adding one more step in the process between the individual’s money 
and the online gambling website.129 As a result, detection and 
enforcement of bans on internet gambling transactions remains an 
almost impossible task.130 
The emergence of cryptocurrency,131such as Bitcoin,132 further 
complicates the issue. Because the digital currencies use 
enforcement agencies, Bank of America, Fleet, Direct Merchant’s Bank, Chase 
Bank, American Express, and Discover have policies that prohibit their cards form 
being used for internet gambling purposes).  
125. Id. at 807–08. 
126. Id. at 807–11. 
127. Id. at 808; Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5364 
(2006). 
 128. Raj, supra note 44, at 809 (“Gamblers use online payment providers such as 
PayPal and Neteller to circumvent the system when credit card companies deny 
their gambling-related transactions.”); see also Parke, supra note 119, at 296–98 
(discussing the efforts of the United States in prohibiting internet gambling). 
 129. See Raj, supra note 44, at 809 (noting that these online payment providers 
also allow a consumer to fund the account via credit card transactions, making 
determining whether money is deposited for gambling or other legitimate activities 
impossible). 
130. Id. at 809–10. 
 131. Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
cryptocurrency.asp [http://perma.cc/2347-KQ8C] (last visited June 20, 2018) (“A 
cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that uses cryptography for security.”). 
132. Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin. 
asp [http://perma.cc/SKG4-BJT2] (last visited June 20, 2018) (explaining that 
Bitcoin is a digital currency created in 2009 that follows a set of ideas written  by 
Satoshi Nakamoto, offering low transactions fees and operated by a decentralized 
authority). Using peer-to-peer technology, Bitcoin facilitates instant payments, 
and the total market cap for all bitcoin in circulation is over $7 billion USD. Id. As 
of February 2018, the value of a single bitcoin was worth about $8,524. Bitcoin Price 
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cryptography for security, it is extremely difficult to counterfeit.133 
The most defining feature of cryptocurrencies, however, is their 
decentralized nature.134 Cryptocurrencies are not issued by a central 
bank or government, but rather are “mined” through digital 
means.135 This leaves cryptocurrencies outside the range of 
government currency manipulation or other interference.136 With 
the added anonymity that cryptocurrency brings137—adding yet 
another step between the individual player, the payment provider, 
and the online casino—enforcement on financial institutions, credit 
card companies, and online payment providers becomes 
increasingly futile.138 
& Updates, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/bitcoin/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8Q9C-V7V2] (last visited June 20, 2018). See generally Ameer Rosic, What 
is Cryptocurrency: Everything You Need To Know [Ultimate Guide],  BLOCK GEEKS, https:// 
blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-cryptocurrency/ [https:// perma.cc/EU5F-S6N4] 
(last visited June 20, 2018) (“[C]ryptocurrencies have become a global 
phenomenon known to most people.”). 
133. See Cryptocurrency, supra note 131. 
134. See id. 
135. See Difficulty (Cryptocurrencies), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.co 
m/terms/d/difficultycryptocurrencies.asp#ixzz56kqCIisN [https://perma.cc/6CT
7-96UE] (last visited June 20, 2018) (“Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies that 
use proof-of-work blockchains are maintained through a process called mining. In 
this system, miners—computers running the cryptocurrency’s software client—
compete to find a new block, adding the most recent batch of transaction data to 
the chain. They receive fees and a (in some cases) a reward of new tokens in 
return.”); Bitcoin, supra note 132 (“Bitcoin mining is the process through which 
bitcoins are released to come into circulation. Basically, it involves solving a 
computationally difficult puzzle to discover a new block, which is added to the 
blockchain, and receiving a reward in the form of few bitcoins.”). 
 136. See What is Cryptocurrency, supra note 132 (explaining cryptocurrencies “take 
away the control central banks take on inflation or deflation by manipulating the 
monetary supply”). 
 137. See Cryptocurrency, supra note 131 (noting that the anonymous nature of 
cryptocurrency transactions makes them “well-suited for a host of nefarious 
activities, such as money laundering and tax evasion.”). Incidentally, for the same 
reason that cryptocurrency is well-suited for illegal activities like money laundering 
and tax evasion, it is also well-suited for online-gambling related transactions. See 
Bitcoin, supra note 132. 
138. See Caroline Winter, Poker Websites See Bitcoin Currency as Way to Avoid U.S. 
Laws, BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTERPRISE (Jan. 3, 2013, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/product/blaw/document/MG2K496S972L 
[https://perma.cc/CDD5-LATT] (“The online currency may allow American 
gamblers to avoid running afoul of complex U.S. laws that prevent businesses from 
knowingly accepting money transfers for Internet gambling purposes.”); Gheorghe, 
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The other focus of modern regulation on internet gambling is 
the prohibition of transferring of internet gambling data.139 One way 
of stopping the flow of gambling data is through the use of “content 
filtering technology.”140 This technology is implemented through 
“IP Address Blocking” and “DNS Blocking,” both of which require 
the Internet Service Provider (ISP) to adopt these measures.141 
These measures are, again, largely futile with the advances in 
technology through the use of “anonymizers” or VPN services that 
disguise web traffic.142 This method also leads to troubling 
censorship concerns in its enforcement, forcing ISPs to filter content 
that the government deems unseemly.143 This is a slippery slope and 
should not be encouraged, especially when its effect on the negative 
effects of gambling is probably negligible with such easy 
workarounds by both offshore casinos and individual internet 
gamblers.144  
IV. ONLINE GAMBLING IN MINNESOTA
A. Gambling Context in Minnesota 
Gambling in Minnesota can be traced back to at least 1857, 
when the Minnesota Constitution referenced a prohibition on 
supra note 49 (explaining the use of cryptocurrency in online gambling-related 
transactions.). 
139. See Raj, supra note 44, at 811. 
 140. Id. at 811 (“Content filtering is a technology most notable for preventing 
children from accessing sensitive web sites. However, as a theoretical matter, 
content filtering can be used in other areas.”). 
141. Id. (explaining that IP filtering can be implemented quickly and easily by 
ISPs, but DNS filtering would take much further effort; and, failure by an ISP to 
implement such systems creates a problematic loophole). 
 142. See Pempus, supra note 47 (explaining how VPNs allow an 
individual gambler to evade IP address detection); Ensuring Complete and 
Continuous Anonymity Online, ANONYMIZER, https://www.anonymizer.com/how-it-
works[https://perma.cc/LV2K-MWLC] (last visited June 20, 2018) (“Anonymizer’s 
personal VPN routes all your traffic through an encrypted tunnel directly from your 
laptop to our secure and hardened servers and network. We then mask your REAL 
IP address to ensure that you have complete and continuous anonymity for all your 
online activities.”). 
 143. See McCullagh, supra note 8 (“[T]here is an abundance of evidence that 
implementation of the Act [in Pennsylvania allowing the attorney general to force 
ISPs to filter content] has resulted in massive suppression of speech protected by 
the First Amendment.”). 
144. See id.; Pempus, supra note 47. 
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“lotteries.”145 Where there is gambling, there is pressure to suppress 
gambling.146 In fact, when the Minnesota Constitution was adopted 
in 1858, it had a provision that expressly prohibited the legislature 
from authorizing “any lottery or the sale of lottery tickets.”147  
Although gambling was banned by the state, it continued to 
flourish in underground card games and slot machines—commonly 
found in restaurants and bars—until gambling was allowed in the 
form of bingo for charitable purposes.148 Then, in 1963, the 
Minnesota Legislature recodified the state’s criminal laws and 
exempted “private social bets not part of or incidental to organized, 
commercialized, or systematic gambling” from its general 
prohibition on gambling, other than bingo.149 This allowed 
smaller-scale gambling and demonstrated the state’s increasingly 
lenient attitude towards gambling.150 Later, this leniency was further 
expanded upon as Minnesota legalized raffles, wheel of fortune, 
tipboards, and pull-tabs.151 Bingo continued to increase in 
popularity, and several high-stakes bingo halls opened on Native 
American reservations.152 Horse racing was also legalized after a 
referendum of Minnesota voters allowed the measure to move to a 
 145. MINNESOTA STATE LOTTERY, OVERVIEW 8 (2013), https://www.leg.state. 
mn.us/docs/2013/other/130693.pdf [https://perma.cc/ D5DL-63P2] (providing 
a summary of gambling in Minnesota covering the history and legal status of 
gambling in the state) [hereinafter MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013]. 
 146. JOHN WILLIAMS, GAMBLING IN MINNESOTA: A SHORT HISTORY, MINNESOTA
HOUSE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 7 (2005) (“While the urge to gamble is probably older 
than written history, in Minnesota the urge to suppress gambling is older than 
statehood.”). 
147. Id. 
 148. MINNESOTA STATE LOTTERY, GAMBLING IN MINNESOTA: AN
OVERVIEW 5 (2011), http://www.northstarproblemgambling.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/01/Gambling-in-Minnesota-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/28QN-
98G2] [hereinafter MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2011]. Slot machines also saw a rise and 
fall in Minnesota since their invention in the early 1900s. Id. At one point in 1946, 
the federal government taxed 8,479 slot machines in Minnesota. Id. After Luther 
Youngdahl took office and took action against slot machines in 1952, the federal 
government taxed only two slot machines in Minnesota. Id. at 6; see also WILLIAMS, 
supra note 146, at 7–8. 
149. WILLIAMS, supra note 146, at 8. 
150. See id. 
151. Id. at 9. 
152. Id. at 30. By 1987, at least fourteen high-stakes bingo halls were open on 
Minnesota reservations, including the Little Six parlor on the Mdewakanton Sioux 
reservation near Shakopee. Id. 
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ballot.153 The first track, Canterbury Downs in Shakopee, opened in 
1985 and is still operating today.154 
In 1967, for the first time in Minnesota history, the state itself 
benefited from gambling when the legislature extended the state’s 
sales tax to bingo games.155 The idea that the state could raise 
revenue through gambling was enticing to lawmakers, and efforts to 
enact a state lottery were put into effect.156 Finally, in 1988, 
Minnesota voters approved a constitutional amendment changing 
the constitution to permit a “lottery operated by the state.”157  
After the federal government passed IGRA in 1988,158 Native 
American tribes were given the opportunity to negotiate with states 
over the regulation of gambling on Native American reservations.159 
Under IGRA, any form of gambling not expressly prohibited by the 
state for any purpose could be negotiated.160 
Minnesota entered into IGRA negotiations with eleven Native 
American tribes between 1989 and 1991.161 The state and the eleven 
tribes first reached an agreement governing video games of chance 
between 1989 and 1991.162 Later negotiations permitted tribes to 
conduct blackjack in exchange for a tribal agreement not to pursue 
other forms of gambling.163 This was the beginning of the large-scale 
Native American casino industry in Minnesota. By 1992, there were 
fourteen casinos in the state with more than 9,000 video gambling 
machines.164 A year later, the number of Native American casinos 
increased to seventeen.165  
In the mid-1990s, the rapid expansion of gambling caused by 
IGRA slowed, as Minnesota lawmakers needed to analyze the 
 153. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2011, supra note 148, at 6–7. The Minnesota 
legislature decided that a public referendum to gauge the acceptance of gambling 
on horse racing was safer than putting the measure to a vote immediately. Id. The 
measure passed 64% to 36%. Id.  
154. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145, at 6. 
155. Id. 
156. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2011, supra note 148, at 6. 
157. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145, at 9 (citing MINN. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 5). 
158. WILLIAMS, supra note 146, at 31. 
159. Id. 
160. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145. 
161. WILLIAMS, supra note 146, at 32. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 34. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 4. 
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situation.166 However, in 1999, the government authorized card 
clubs at licensed racetracks, such as Canterbury Park.167 In 2005, the 
government legalized limited Texas Hold ‘em poker tournaments in 
restaurants and bars.168 Finally, in 2012, an electronic form of 
pull-tabs and electronically-linked bingo games were authorized to 
combat charitable gambling’s declining revenues and to help fund 
the new Minnesota Vikings stadium.169  
There was no continuous expansion during this time period, 
however, and in 2009, Minnesota ordered ISPs to block customer 
access to certain online gambling sites,170 citing the UIGEA 
provisions that allow for state governments to enforce the statute.171 
This and other similar governmental actions raised First 
Amendment concerns of overbreadth by essentially censoring entire 
websites, where it is plausible that not everything on the website is 
illegal speech.172 The Interactive Media Entertainment and Gaming 
Association (IMEGA) challenged the action in federal district 
court.173 IMEGA argued that: (1) the state’s action violated the right 
 166. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2011, supra note 148, at 7–8. Attorney General 
Hubert Humphrey III stated at the time, “[w]e’ve been expanding at a very rapid 
pace. We’ve got to stop, got to take a breath and see what we have, see how well it’s 
operating.” Id. at 8. 
 167. Resources on Minnesota Issues: Gambling, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. (Oct. 
2017), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/guides?issue=gambling [https:// 
perma.cc/9XA6-MVMC] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
168. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2011, supra note 148, at 8. 
 169. See generally MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145, at 6, 8 (describing 
charitable gambling). 
170. McCullagh, supra note 8. 
171. See RUSSELL K. MAYER, TAKING ACTION ON INTERNET GAMBLING: FEDERAL
POLICYMAKING 1995–2011, 25 (2014) (using the rise and fall of the internet gambling 
industry to illustrate a new approach to understanding how public policy is made in 
the United States). 
 172. See McCullagh, supra note 8 (comparing the Minnesota order to an 
analogous Pennsylvania law which allowed the Attorney General to order ISPs to 
block possibly illegal websites). A federal judge in Philadelphia struck down the law 
for violating the First Amendment, stating, “[t]here is little evidence the act has 
reduced the production of [illegal activity] . . . . On the other hand there is an 
abundance of evidence that implementation of the Act has resulted in massive 
suppression of speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id.  (citing Ctr. For 
Democ. & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2004)). 
 173. See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, No. CIV.A. 07-
2625MLC, 2008 WL 5586713, at *1–11 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2008), aff’d, Interactive Media 
Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 580 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2009); 
MAYER, supra note 171, at 25. 
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 9
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss3/9
  
2018] ONLINE GAMBLING REGULATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 1129 
of Minnesotans to access indisputably legal material contained on 
these sites and to participate in legal online discussions;174 and 
(2) due to the nature of the technology used for blocking access, the 
statute could not be enforced fairly and comprehensively,175 and was 
therefore discriminatory.176 As a result of the IMEGA challenge, the 
Minnesota Attorney General rescinded the blacklist order before it 
was resolved in court.177 This series of events illustrates the difficulty 
of enforcing laws like UIGEA when it comes to preventing internet 
gambling. Attempts to do so are often either cost prohibitive—such 
that any enforcement is too costly to see any meaningful effect on 
the diminishing of the illegal activity—or simply overbroad, raising 
First Amendment concerns.178 
Today, after near continuous expansion of gambling in 
Minnesota,179 Minnesotans have many options to gamble in the 
state.180 Slot machines and blackjack are readily available at any of 
the eighteen casinos located on tribal land.181 Lottery tickets for the 
state lottery can be purchased at many retail outlets throughout the 
state.182 Card games like Texas Hold ‘em can be played at the 
 174. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, 2008 WL 5586713, at *6–8; MAYER, 
supra note 171, at 25. 
 175. Brief for Plaintiff at 49, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. 
Gonzales, 2008 WL 5586713 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2008) (No. CIV.A. 07-2625MLC), 2010 
WL 5916896 at 49. 
 176. See MAYER, supra note 171, at 25. This is because of the way the internet is 
designed. Many websites share one IP address. Id. Blocking one IP address makes 
the entire shared list inaccessible. Id. Thus, blocking an IP address that is used as an 
internet gambling website may also block other legal websites, making the action 
overbroad and violating the First Amendment. See id. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. 
179. Summarizing the major developments of Minnesota gambling legislation, 
the Minnesota Legislative Reference Library provides an excellent guide illustrating 
the history of this topic and operates as a general timeline. See Resources on Minnesota 
Issues: Gambling, supra note 167 (showing legislative progression from HF 1303; 
Bingo legalized in 1945, to HG1825; Canterbury Park granted authority to establish 
a card club in 1999).  
 180. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145, at 7. Many Minnesotans 
participate in these many options of gambling. A survey conducted by the Minnesota 
State Lottery and St. Cloud State University showed that 76% of Minnesotan adults 
had participated in at least one form of the available gambling methods in 
Minnesota in 2012. Id. 
181. MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2011, supra note 148, at 8. 
182. Id. 
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racetrack card clubs or in tournaments in restaurants and bars.183 
Pull-tabs and bingo, even in electronic form, can be enjoyed in many 
more establishments.184 Finally, Minnesotans can leave the state to 
play other casino games, and many Minnesotans participate in the 
relatively gray area of online gambling.185 
B. Minnesota Tribal Compacts 
According to some commentators, Minnesota compacts are 
some of the most favorable to tribes in the United States today.186 
None of Minnesota’s twenty-two separate compacts with eleven 
Native American tribes require Native American-owned gambling 
operations to provide any revenue or benefits to the state.187 And 
unlike many other states, the Minnesota compacts do not have a 
provision that requires a periodic opening of the compacts to 
renegotiation.188 Accordingly, Minnesota misses out on significant 
amounts of revenue compared to other states.189 Connecticut, for 
example, received between $300 and $400 million a year from just 
two Native American casinos in the mid-2000s.190 Minnesota also 
lacks any leverage to renegotiate these compacts, as the Native 
American tribes have no incentive to change their favorable terms 
without a mandatory renegotiation period.191 With the Minnesota 
government always looking for sources of income, many lawmakers 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. (“They can leave the state to gamble at resort casinos in places like 
Nevada or Mississippi, play at riverboat casinos in Iowa or Illinois, visit a ‘racino’ in 
Iowa, play gaming machines in bars and restaurants in South Dakota or Manitoba, 
or play charitable blackjack in North Dakota. And they can, and do, participate in 
unregulated and possibly illegal activities such as sports pools and wagering on the 
Internet.”).  
 186. See Briana Bierschbach, 20 Years Later, State-Tribal Gaming Compacts Still 
Produce Friction, MINN. LAW. (Sept. 21, 2011), http://minnlawyer.com/2011/09/21/ 
20-years-later-state-tribal-gaming-compacts-still-produce-friction/ 
[https://perma.cc/8YFR-9G7Z] (noting the differences between Minnesota state-
tribal gaming contracts and other state compacts). 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. Id. Some estimate that gambling revenues from Native American casino 
operations in Minnesota are between $4 billion and $10 billion annually. Id. 
190. Id. 
 191. See id. Each Minnesota tribal compact remains in effect until renegotiated. 
Both parties, however, must be willing to come to the table for any renegotiations 
to begin. 
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have shown interest in the untapped source of potential tax revenue 
that could be gained from renegotiating these compacts.192 
The problem for the Minnesota government began by 
underestimating the popularity of gambling.193 Newspapers at the 
time did not even publish reports until after the deals were already 
made.194 Since few negotiators at the time thought that the tribal 
compacts were particularly important, the agreements hindered 
future state interests in gambling revenues.195 
This problem was compounded when the Native American 
tribes began accumulating large sums of money, funding a political 
force in Saint Paul, and fighting any political action aimed at 
breaking the tribes’ monopoly on casino gambling in Minnesota.196 
As Native American gambling interests and influence increased in 
Minnesota, and as Republican-proposed legislation advocated for 
state competition with tribal casinos, most of the Minnesota tribes 
naturally solidified their support for the Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
Party in the early 2000s.197 Political ideas to break this monopoly 
included the creation of a major gambling facility located in the 
metro area (and off tribal land, therefore allowing taxation), 
authorizing electronic gambling in bars and restaurants, and the 
construction of a “racino”—a racetrack with gambling facilities like 
slot machines, blackjack, or other casino games.198  
192. See id. 
 193. See id. One of the negotiators at the time, former Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
(DFL) Party Senate Majority Leader Dean Johnson, remembered that most people 
“thought [Native American gambling] was going to be a nickel-and-dime 
operation—just a few machines here and there.” Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id.; see also Charlie Vig & Keven Leecy, Don’t Let Tribal Gaming Off the 
Reservation, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.startribune.com/don-
t-let-tribal-gaming-off-the-reservation/229324201/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4G-YVY8] 
(demonstrating tribal leaders’ opposition to any gambling expansion off of tribal 
land because of their belief that “Indian gaming is and should remain a reservation-
based economic development tool that helps fund the vital tasks of tribal 
governments, create jobs for Minnesotans and improve the lives of Indian people”). 
197. See Bierschbach, supra note 186. 
 198. Id. Other attempts at breaking the Native American gambling monopoly 
included a 2004 bill to ban gambling in the state altogether unless Minnesota tribes 
renegotiated their compacts to share revenue with the state. Id. The Minnesota 
tribes that benefit the least from the current tribal compacts and the state also made 
a joint effort to break the monopoly by proposing a state-tribal casino venture that 
would be located in the metro area (off of tribal land). Id. This venture was heavily 
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Legalizing internet gambling in Minnesota could potentially 
hurt the tribal monopolies on gambling by creating another 
accessible opportunity for Minnesotans to gamble outside tribal 
land.199 Thus, it is natural for Minnesota tribes to oppose an 
expansion of internet gambling expansion and view it as a slippery 
slope, as expansion would lead states to aggressively compete with 
tribal casinos, which is contrary to the intent of IGRA.200 Tribes may 
also argue that “[t]he market in most states simply isn’t big enough 
to sustain healthy tribal gaming trying to compete with new state 
authorized or sponsored nontribal gaming.”201 However, one would 
have to take the tribes at their word regarding the size of the 
gambling market because tribes are not obligated by law to release 
their gambling revenue data.202 
C. The Impact of Gambling in Minnesota
Without question, Minnesota tribal casinos have a positive 
economic impact on the state.203 After conducting a study in 2016, 
the Minnesota Indian Gaming Association (MIGA) noted several key 
findings on the direct impact of Native American gaming: 
(1) The combined Indian casinos and related ancillary facilities 
are the fourteenth-largest employer in Minnesota, with an 
annual average of 15,287 employees; 
(2) Tribally-owned casinos and non-gaming enterprises pay 
over $500 million annually in earnings and benefits to their 
employees and generate approximately $126 million in 
payroll-related taxes each year; 
opposed by the Minnesota Indian Gaming Association (MIGA), indicating that not 
all tribes have equal interests in the current compacts. Id; see also Vig & Leecy, supra 
note 196 (demonstrating MIGA’s opposition to tribal gaming located off tribal 
land). 
199. Vig & Leecy, supra note 196. 
 200. Id. (noting that the congressional intent behind the IGRA was to stimulate 
economic development and job creation on Indian reservations, which in turn 
would move tribal governments closer to self-sufficiency). 
201. Id. 
202. Bierschbach, supra note 186. 
203. See MINN. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING
IN MINNESOTA, (Aug. 2016), http://www.mnindiangamingassoc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/2016-MIGA-ECONOMIC-IMPACT-STUDY.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/TKP9-G6MJ] (presenting an analysis of the economic impact, 
including tax revenue generated, of Indian gaming on tribal, local, and state 
economies as well as employment, tourism, and government services).  
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(3) Annual purchases for goods and services for ongoing 
operations are over $717 million, including over $482 
million from Minnesota vendors; 
(4) Over the past twenty-five years, Minnesota tribes have 
invested more than $2.5 billion in their casinos and 
tribally-owned enterprises, including almost $200 million in 
2015 alone and an investment projection of $300 million in 
2016–2017; and 
(5) Minnesota Indian casinos attract almost 23 million visitors 
each year, which includes more than 2.4 million visitors 
from outside Minnesota, making Indian gaming the 
second-largest tourism attraction in the state (second only 
to the Mall of America).204 
This report shows the success and growth of tribal gambling in 
Minnesota.205 Further, it shows that, while the State may not directly 
tax Native American gambling revenues, it still receives money in the 
form of substantial payroll taxes from what is, combined, the 
fourteenth-largest employer in Minnesota.206 Additional money is 
also undoubtedly spent at casinos and surrounding businesses, as 
Native American casinos in Minnesota are the second-largest tourist 
attraction in the state.207  
The MIGA report further touched on the multiplier effect that 
Native American gambling has on the Minnesota economy.208 Key 
findings in the MIGA report include: 
204. Id. at 7. 
205. See id. 
206. Indian employees who live and work on the reservation are exempt from 
state withholding taxes but pay federal withholding. Id. Indian-owned businesses, 
such as tribal casinos, and their employees are also subject to Social Security and 
Medicare taxes. Id. Further, non-Indian employees and Indian employees not living 
on the reservation are subject to both federal and state withholding. Id. Thus, 
Indian-owned businesses do in fact make contributions both directly and indirectly 
to state and federal tax revenue. See id. at 16 (noting there is a common 
misconception that Indian tribes, including those with gaming facilities, operate 
completely free of taxes).  
 207. See id. at 18 (explaining that when visitors come to Minnesota to gamble, 
many stay at tribally-owned hotels, which can accommodate over two million visitors 
annually). 
 208. Id. at 7–8. See generally The Multiplier Effect, ECON. ONLINE,
www.economicsonline.co.uk/Managing_the_economy/The_multiplier_effect.htm
l (last visited June 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S3TD-VLNR] (“The multiplier 
effect refers to the increase in final income arising from any new injection of 
spending. The size of the multiplier depends upon . . . marginal decisions to 
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(1) Total annual multiplier output of almost $1.8 billion in the 
State of Minnesota; 
(2) Stabilized multiplier employment of 11,584 jobs in 
Minnesota, combined with direct employment, creating 
total additional stabilized employment impact of 26,871 
jobs; and 
(3) Annual multiplier wages of almost $605 million statewide, 
combined with direct earnings, creating a total additional 
annual wages of over $1 billion.209 
Money spent at Native American enterprises is redistributed 
into the economy in the form of wages, taxes, and expenditures for 
goods and services, effectively multiplying the total amount of money 
in the economy compared to when the money is saved.210 Thus, the 
total economic impact of Native American gambling in Minnesota 
should not be understated, as the benefits of the industry are 
positive. 
1. Minnesota State-Sponsored Gambling Revenue Suggests Greater
Revenue from Legalized Gambling
If Minnesota were to legalize online gambling, there would be 
great economic potential from the tax dollars raised. Since state-run 
or sponsored gambling activities would occur off Native American 
tribal land and since no law prohibits taxation on such activities, the 
State of Minnesota forgoes potential tax revenue by not legalizing all 
gambling.211 Regarding recent state-sponsored gambling revenues 
and how these revenues were used: 
(1) In fiscal year 2016, the tax on lawful gambling raised $55.8 
million;212 
spend . . . or to save.”). 
209. See MINN. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 203, at 7–8. 
210. See id. at 19 (“Money is never actually ‘lost’ in a casino. Rather it too is 
redistributed back into the economy . . . . In the same manner that the casino 
redistributes the gaming win and other revenue it receives, the people to whom 
those wages are paid and from whom the goods and services are purchased further 
redistribute the money they receive in wages to their employees and purchases for 
their own operating needs.”). 
 211. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GAMBLING TAXES (2017), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/databook/gambtax.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/T3JX-UTYR] (reporting gambling taxes on various activities, including lawful 
(charitable) gambling, pari-mutuel betting, and the state lottery).  
212. Id. 
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(2) The state tax on pari-mutuel betting (horse racing), which 
is 6% of the “takeout,” generated less than $1 million in 
fiscal year 2015 and no revenue in fiscal year 2016;213 and 
(3) In fiscal year 2016, the Minnesota State Lottery raised $144.7 
million: $1.6 million of which was dedicated to problem 
gambling treatment, $14 million to game and fish, $14 
million to natural resources, and $38.3 million to the 
Natural Resources Trust Fund.214 
With only about $200 million raised from Minnesota’s direct 
gambling taxes on state-sponsored gambling activities, Minnesota 
could gain considerably greater tax revenue by expanding these 
activities to include internet gambling or sports betting. 
2. Compulsive Gambling and Social Impact in Minnesota
Problem gambling, as defined by the National Council on 
Problem Gambling, is the: 
[C]ondition known as “pathological” or “compulsive” 
gambling, a progressive addiction characterized by 
increasing preoccupation with gambling, a need to bet 
more money more frequently, restlessness or irritability 
when attempting to stop, “chasing” losses, and loss of 
control manifested by continuation of the gambling 
behavior in spite of mounting, serious, negative 
consequences.215 
The Northstar Problem Gambling Alliance, which is the 
Minnesota affiliate to the National Council on Problem Gambling, 
estimates that 0.5% to 1.5% of the Minnesota public has “serious 
compulsive gambling issues,” with another 1.5% to 4% of the public 
dealing with “varying levels of gambling problems.”216 This suggests 
that about 220,000 Minnesotans are affected by problem 
 213. Id. (defining “takeout” as “the percentage deducted by the racetrack from 
each pari-mutuel pool before payouts on winnings tickets”). At Canterbury Park, 
“the takeout averages about 20% of total betting.” Id. “The first $12 million in 
takeout,” however, “is exempt from tax” under the current rule. Id. 
214. Id. 
 215. MINN. DEP’T. OF HUM. SERV., COMPULSIVE GAMBLING ANNUAL REPORT: A
REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE 9 (2014), https://www.leg. 
state.mn.us/docs/2014/mandated/140697.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9MB-U5VA] 
(“In extreme cases, problem gambling can result in financial ruin, legal problems, 
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gambling.217 For each individual person affected by problem 
gambling, spouses, family members, employers, and other members 
of the community are also affected by the behavior. 218  
Naturally, Minnesota lawmakers want to know how the 
availability of and access to gambling impacts problem gamblers.219 
Lawmakers want to ensure that the negative consequences of 
gambling do not outweigh its social and economic benefits.220 This 
type of data is difficult to gather in Minnesota, as gambling revenue 
collected by the state is not collected or identified with patron level 
detail.221 However, each year the Department of Human Services 
(DHS) Commissioner releases a report on the percentage of 
gambling revenues that come from “problem gamblers” to the chairs 
and ranking minority members of the legislative committees having 
jurisdiction over compulsive gambling.222 This report estimates the 
proportion of gambling revenues generated from problem gamblers 
by consulting national and international experts and reviewing 
studies conducted in locations where the data is easily accessible.223  
The studies examined in the Compulsive Gambling Report, 
conducted in jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States as a whole, estimated that the proportion of revenue 
raised from problem gamblers ranged from 15% to 33%.224 With 
such a wide range of estimates and no data specific to Minnesota, it 
is hard for lawmakers to accurately assess the situation. The data 
highlights the need for more resources to be dedicated to research, 
prevention programs, and treatment programs for problem 
gamblers.225  
In Minnesota, DHS runs the Compulsive Gambling Program, a 
program that has been in place since the Minnesota State Lottery 
217. Id. 
218. See id. 
219. Id. at 4. 
220. Id. 
221. See id. at 5 (“[T]he criteria for participating in any form of gambling does 
not intersect with any mode of identity.”). 
222. Id. at 4. 
 223. See id. at 8 (stating that the Department of Human Services (DHS) has 
“reviewed research studies that demonstrate how to estimate the proportion of 
gambling revenues generated by problem gamblers”). 
224. See id. at 10.  
225. See id. (“[W]hat is primarily needed is the implementation of effective 
policies to minimize the negative impacts of gambling and substantially reduce the 
disproportionate financial draw from problem gamblers.”). 
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began operations in 1990.226 This program includes a helpline, 
public awareness efforts, educational activities, and treatment 
services.227 These efforts, along with others that reduce the negative 
effects of gambling, should be continued so that the positive effects 
of gambling might be enjoyed. Simultaneously striking the right 
balance between the economic benefits and social costs of gambling, 
continuing to honor the legislative intent behind IGRA, stimulating 
tribal economies, and continuing to allow room for innovation and 
growth in the gambling industry is no small feat. Few jurisdictions 
have been able to find solutions that work.228 But there are solutions. 
V. A PATH FORWARD FOR MINNESOTA LAWMAKERS
Regulating the gambling industry is a balancing act. 
Policymakers need to be sure that any actions they take to regulate 
the industry will stand the test of time, as the industry is constantly 
evolving.229 To do this, these actions must balance all of the relevant 
factors—different state and tribal interests, social costs involved with 
problem gambling, economic benefits, and growth and innovation 
interests.230 This is especially true in Minnesota, where history has 
shown substantial conflicts of interest.231 While there is likely no 
226. Id. at 4. 
 227. See id. DHS provides a free, confidential, twenty-four-hour service line 
reachable at the Minnesota Problem Gambling Helpline at (800) 333-HOPE. Id. On 
the state compulsive gambling program website (www.nojudgment.com 
[https://perma.cc/33HY-B37A]), there is a list of Minnesota-approved gambling 
treatment providers by county, as well as downloadable brochures for communities 
and treatment counselors to use for educating the public. Id. Furthermore, DHS 
provides funding to individuals who have no other source of payment or insurance 
coverage for gambling treatment. Id. 
228. See, e.g., Steve Ruddock, View: Why New Jersey is Doing a Good Job Combating 
Problem Gambling, PLAY NJ (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.playnj.com/news/new-jersey-
problem-gambling/17469/ [https://perma.cc/3KPG-EQ5B]. But see, e.g., New 
Jersey’s Gambling Problem is Bad, Likely to Get Worse, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY 
(Jan. 28, 2018), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/editorials/new-
jersey-s-gambling-problem-is-bad-likely-to-get/article_3d465ecd-0f18-57d9-ba07-cbd 
cbc6f1b3d.html [https://perma.cc/RB87-GXLN]. 
 229. See Bierschbach, supra note 186 (highlighting how poorly-negotiated state-
tribal compacts taking no portion of revenue from the tribes with no mandatory 
renegotiation period has made it difficult for the Minnesota government to raise 
tax revenue from Native American gambling operations). 
 230. Supra Part IV (describing the different state and tribal interests in 
Minnesota). 
231. The Minnesota state government wants to raise money from gambling 
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perfect solution to balance all these interests, considering each 
interest is essential in formulating a way forward. Below is one such 
solution. 
A. Legalize Online Gambling in Minnesota
The solution, which may seem obvious, is to legalize online 
gambling in Minnesota. There are many reasons to consider this 
option. First, Minnesota stands to gain substantial revenue that could 
be raised through a direct tax on online gambling proceeds.232 In 
addition, the State could also collect licensure fees as companies 
compete for a strategically limited supply of online gambling 
licenses.233 Second, legalizing and regulating online gambling in 
Minnesota would protect Minnesotans who are currently gambling 
on potentially unregulated, offshore websites.234 Third, the growth 
of the online gambling industry would stimulate the economy by 
creating jobs and growing wages.235 Finally, any concern that 
legalized online gambling would be detrimental to the existing 
Native American casinos in Minnesota is misguided.236 In fact, 
contrary to popular belief, studies have shown that online gambling 
has a complementary impact on land-based casino revenues.237 
revenues while minimizing the negative impact of gambling on society. See supra 
Part IV.C. Larger tribes in Minnesota that benefit from the current tribal compacts 
want to keep the terms as they are, while other, smaller tribes located in more 
remote areas want to renegotiate the compacts to allow them to open casinos on 
state land. See Bierschbach, supra note 186; Vig & Leecy supra note 196. Further, 
Minnesota has a state interest in promoting innovation and growth where possible 
and thus should entertain internet gambling possibilities and not enter into lose-
lose enforcement situations where enforcement is cost prohibitive, constitutionally 
unviable, and likely ineffective as a result of evolving technology. 
232. See Bierschbach, supra note 186. 
 233. See Grove, supra note 114 (listing some of the possible reasons why the 
Pennsylvania legislature decided to authorize online gambling, among other things, 
in its most recent gambling overhaul bill). 
234. See id.; see also MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145 (noting that a 
survey conducted by the Minnesota State Lottery and St. Cloud State University 
showed that 76% of Minnesota adults participated in at least one form of the 
available gambling methods, including online gambling, in Minnesota in 2011). 
235. See id. 
236. See Vig & Leecy, supra note 196. 
 237. Kahlil S. Philander, Brett Abarbanel, & Toni Repetti, Consumer Spending in 
the Gaming Industry: Evidence of Complementary Demand in Casino and Online Venues, 15 
INT’L GAMBLING STUD. 23 (June 2015) (“A robust complementary (positive) 
relationship between online and offline gambling is found.”). The authors of the 
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The first step in legalizing online gambling is authorizing 
Minnesota residents to participate in online gambling activities on 
websites that are owned and operated in Minnesota. This express 
authorization clears up the current gray area238 in Minnesota law 
regarding online gambling. It also acts as a form of advertisement 
for the soon-to-be-available online casinos that the state can use to 
raise tax revenue.239 
Minnesota has many of the same goals and interests as 
Pennsylvania, the most recent state to legalize online gambling 
within its borders.240 First, Minnesota has an interest in raising more 
tax revenue on gambling activities within the state.241 Second, 
Minnesota has an interest in protecting its citizens from being 
deceived by offshore gambling websites that may take advantage of 
their users.242 Finally, Minnesota does not want to hurt land-based, 
tribal casinos by introducing undue competition that would hurt the 
profits of Native American tribes that rely on gambling income for 
self-sufficiency.243 Thus, Minnesota should seek to emulate some of 
Pennsylvania’s methods when crafting its own law—perhaps even 
using Pennsylvania’s bill as a template—while keeping in mind the 
relevant differences between the two states’ economic, legislative, 
and social contexts.244 
study go on to suggest that the economic concerns of some stakeholders that online 
gambling will result in the cannibalization of brick-and-mortar casino products 
should be reconsidered. Id.; cf. Vig & Leecy, supra note 196 (showing tribal leaders 
stating that the gambling market in Minnesota is too small to accommodate the 
extra competition that off-reservation gambling operations, including online 
casinos, can bring). 
 238. Online gambling is neither expressly authorized nor prohibited by current 
Minnesota law. See MINN. STAT. § 609.75 (2017) (setting forth the current statutory 
framework of gambling law in Minnesota). 
 239. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 211 (listing Minnesota’s 
current tax structure on gambling activities within the state). Note that Federal Law 
prohibits Minnesota from directly taxing Native American casinos located on tribal 
land. Id. 
 240. See Grove, supra note 114 (stating that Pennsylvania is trying to remain 
competitive as bordering states have increased competition). 
241. See MINNESOTA OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 145.  
242. See id. 
243. See Vig & Leecy, supra note 196 (noting that the congressional intent 
behind the IGRA was to stimulate economic development and job creation on 
Indian reservations, which in turn would move tribal governments closer to self-
sufficiency). 
244. Some of these differences include a favorable legislative status quo for 
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B. Offer Native American Tribes “First Dibs” on Limited Licenses 
The next step is to offer a limited number of licenses to 
Minnesota businesses, individuals, and Native American tribes, 
allowing them to own and operate online casinos, subject to 
Minnesota laws. One narrowly tailored solution is to allow the Native 
American tribes in Minnesota that will be most impacted by this 
expansion “first dibs” on a portion of the limited number of 
operating licenses. One of the tribes’ main arguments against the 
authorization of off-reservation gambling in Minnesota is that it 
would be contrary to the intent of IGRA, because expansion would 
increase competition and cut into the profit margins of tribes.245 
Giving Native American tribes the opportunity to obtain a license for 
an online casino before other Minnesota residents and businesses 
helps alleviate this concern. By allowing tribes to leverage their 
current land-based gambling operations into full-service brands, 
there will be a competitive advantage for Native American brands. 
The introduction of online gambling has a positive impact on 
land-based casinos because it increases the overall interest of all 
gambling activities within the state.246 Additionally, legalizing online 
casinos helps some of the less-advantaged Minnesotan Native 
American tribes—those who do not have large land-based casino 
operations due to their remote locations—by giving these tribes an 
opportunity to break into the gambling market.247 The positive 
impact of introducing online gambling in Minnesota to Native 
American casinos, combined with the competitive advantage of 
having “first dibs” on the limited number of online casino licenses, 
some Native American tribes with major casinos, Minnesota’s current budget 
surplus, and local problem gambling statistics. See generally MINNESOTA OVERVIEW
2013, supra note 145; H.R. 271, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017). 
 245. See Vig, supra note 196 (“We believe Indian gaming is and should remain a 
reservation-based economic development tool that helps fund the vital tasks of tribal 
governments, create jobs for Minnesotans and improve the lives of Indian people.”). 
 246. See Philander, supra note 237 (finding a positive growth relationship 
between online and offline gambling). 
 247. In fact, some of these tribes have been trying to break into the gambling 
market in Minnesota for years, without success. See Bierschbach, supra note 186 
(discussing a combined effort by state legislators and some of the location-
challenged tribes to create a state-run casino located off tribal land). This effort was 
eventually thwarted by the DFL, influenced by the powerful Tribal lobby MIGA, 
which is made up of tribes that benefit from the current legislative status quo. Id. 
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sufficiently addresses the competitive concerns of Native American 
tribes.  
C. Dedicate a Percentage of Tax Revenue Received from Private 
Companies and Native American-Run Online Casinos to Education, 
Healthcare, and Problem Gambling  
Minnesota lawmakers should consider allocating a percentage 
of the increased tax revenue to causes beneficial to Native American 
tribes. Despite the competitive advantages and positive impact that 
online gambling expansion in Minnesota could provide Native 
American tribes, some tribes—especially those that benefit greatly 
from the current state-tribal compacts—might still feel 
disadvantaged. In further efforts to adequately address all interests, 
a percentage of the tax and/or license revenue raised from this 
online gambling expansion should be dedicated to a fund 
specifically designated to supplement tribal education and 
healthcare. This economic stimulus, combined with the increased 
revenue of Native American tribes as they expand into online 
gambling, falls squarely within the intent of IGRA.248 Thus, this 
provision could be successful in addressing the interests of Native 
American tribes. By doing so, it is more likely that online gambling 
regulation in Minnesota will withstand the test of time. 
Finally, Minnesota lawmakers should dedicate a percentage of 
license and/or tax revenue gained from private companies to a fund 
designed to continue, improve, and create new programs that 
combat problem gambling in Minnesota. The social impact of online 
gambling on problem gamblers is not entirely clear.249 However, it 
makes sense that an increase in the availability of gambling would 
lead to an increase in problem gambling, or at least that it has a 
negative impact on problem gamblers.250 Thus, the expansion of 
online gambling in Minnesota could have some negative social 
effects that lawmakers should minimize to the greatest extent 
possible. In order to combat any negative effects, Minnesota 
 248. See Vig & Leecy, supra note 196 (noting that the intent of the IGRA is 
economic stimulus and job creation on Native American reservations). 
 249. See COMPULSIVE GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 215, at 5 (noting that 
estimating the current impact of gambling availability on problem gamblers is 
difficult because tax revenue data is not collected at the individual level by mode of 
gambling). 
250. See generally id. 
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lawmakers should include a provision in the legislation that provides 
monetary support for these programs. Allocating a percentage of tax 
revenue in this manner would allow Minnesota to appreciate the 
economic benefits of online gambling—tax revenue, job creation, 
and wage growth251—while minimizing the potentially negative 
effects that gambling expansion could have on society.252 
Minnesota stands to gain many benefits from online gambling 
expansion. First, legalizing online gambling in Minnesota would 
eliminate enforcement costs, which often lead the State into no-win 
situations where enforcement is cost-prohibitive or constitutionally 
unviable.253 Second, expanding online gambling would bring jobs to 
Minnesotans, stimulate wage growth, and encourage continuous 
innovation through free-market competition by breaking the Native 
American tribal monopoly on gambling activities in Minnesota.254 
This economic growth would occur without undue burden on Native 
American tribes or problem gamblers, as the proposed solution 
considers and addresses their interests.255 Third, regulating online 
gambling adds clarity to a current gray area of law and protects 
Minnesota citizens from being taken advantage of by offshore 
websites.256 Finally, Minnesota will set an example for other 
jurisdictions by addressing online gambling in a way that is 
sustainable in the long run and beneficial to society.257  
 251. See MINN. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 203, at 7 (presenting an analysis 
of the economic impact of Indian gaming on tribal, local, and state economies, 
including tax revenue generated to the local, state and federal government, 
employment, tourism, and government services). 
 252. See MICHAEL O. EMERSON ET AL., ADULT SURVEY OF MINNESOTA PROBLEM
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR; A NEEDS ASSESSMENT: CHANGES 1990 TO 1994 3–4 (1994); MINN. 
INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, supra note 203 (presenting an analysis of the economic impact 
of Indian gaming on tribal, local, and state economies, including tax revenue 
generated to the local, state and federal government, employment, tourism, and 
government services). 
 253. See McCullagh, supra note 8 (comparing Minnesota’s attempt to require 
ISPs to block online gambling sites to Pennsylvania’s attempt to require ISPs to 
block specific pornographic websites, which was ruled an unconstitutional 
restriction on Free Speech under the First Amendment). 
254. See supra Part IV.C. 
255. See supra Part V.C. 
256. See supra Part V.A. 
257. See supra Part IV. 
38
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 9
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss3/9
  
2018] ONLINE GAMBLING REGULATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 1143 
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulating the gambling industry is a balancing act. The 
industry is rapidly evolving, and the ongoing debate on the morality 
and merits of gambling rages on. The regulatory landscape also 
continues to change, with federal laws being adapted to modern 
situations and a wide variety of state regulations addressing gambling 
in a different way. In order to successfully regulate the gambling 
industry, various stakeholder interests must be considered. But in 
the end, online gambling expansion can positively impact society in 
many ways. 
Minnesota stands to realize these benefits in a sustainable way 
by authorizing online gambling and implementing the proposed 
solution described in this Note. First, the solution suggests 
authorizing online gambling in Minnesota and distributing a limited 
number of licenses—first to Native American tribes, then to 
Minnesota businesses and individuals. Next, Minnesota should 
dedicate a portion of the increased tax revenue to tribal education 
and healthcare, which addresses the competition concerns of Native 
American tribes. Finally, Minnesota should dedicate another portion 
of the increased tax revenue to programs combatting problem 
gambling, which minimizes the negative social impact of gambling 
in Minnesota. Online gambling expansion is part of the evolution of 
the gambling industry, and the policymakers that understand the 
varying interests and can adapt their policies to address these 
interests stand the best chance of finding a sustainable solution that 
benefits society.  
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